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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRILBA A. JONES, by her Guardian ad 
Liten, BONNIE JEWELL SHINER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SHARON COLBY KIEFER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Case No. 18339 
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant to set 
aside two deeds to real property located in Nephi, Juab County, 
Utah. (R. 1) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Court, Honorable J. Robert 
Bullock, sitting without a jury, resulting in a judgment for 
Plaintiff setting aside the two deeds. (R. 22,23) Objections to 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and a 
Motion for a new trial were made by Defendant. (R. 24, 25; 27-34) 
An order was entered denying relief as to all matters raised. 
(R. 38) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That the judgment entered by the Court below be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's first marriage to Sharon Atkin produced nine 
children, six of whom survived to March 3, 1978, to wit: Millie 
Colby, Bonnie Shiner, Mignon Payne, Warren Atkin, Rawlen Atkin, 
and Derrall Atkin. (T. 35, Ln. 9-16) Sharon Atkin died in 1944 
and plaintiff married Grant Jones in 1950. (T. 35, Ln. 23, 24) 
No children were born of this marriage (T. 35, Ln. 27) and on 
July 26, 1965 plaintiff executed a will leaving her estate to 
her husband and in the event he should predecease her to the 
above-mentioned six children. (Exhibit 7) 
Grant Jones and plaintiff purchased the home and real pro-
perty that is the subject of this action in June of 1970 (Exhibit 
2, Page 56) after Mr. Jones retired from the Board of Education 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. (T. 36, Ln. 2-6) Plaintiff and Mr. Jones 
resided alone in the said home located at 409 South First East, 
Nephi, Utah until his death on December 26, 1976. (T. 36, Ln. 9-27) 
After his funeral, it was agreed by the family that Corrine, Grant's 
niece, would take care of paying the bills for the funeral and take 
over the management and supervision of plaintiff's financial affairs. 
(T. 37, Ln. 21-30; 38, Ln. 1-7) 
Approximately one week after the funeral, Corrine had done 
nothing to help plaintiff and from early January, 1977 until Feb-
ruary, 1978 plaintiff's guardian ad litem, Bonnie Jewel Shiner, 
one of plaintiff's children, helped her with her finances as follows: 
obtained Grant's life insurance policy from the safety deposit box 
at First Security Bank in Nephi; paid the expenses of the funeral; 
converted $10,000 in regular savings to certificates of deposit; 
had herself established as a co-tenant, at the request of plaintiff, 
-2-
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on plaintiff's checking and savings accounts, and her safety 
deposit box, all located at First Security Bank in Nephi; rein-
vested and maintained the $10,000 funds for highest interest 
yield; visited plaintiff frequently and reconciled her checking 
account as she was unable to do so; and was generally supportive 
of plaintiff during this period of time. (T. 11, Ln. 4-30; 12, 
Ln. 1-4; 38, Ln. 8-JO; 39, Ln. 1-30; 40, Ln. 1-30; 41, Ln. 1-30; 
42, Ln. 1-26; 56, Ln. 17-30; 57, Ln. 1-13; Exhibit 6) 
Plaintiff lived by herself in the subject home from the 
date of Grant's death until January 31, 1978 when she fell and 
broke her right femur while babysitting. (T. 12, Ln. 5-30; 42, 
Ln. 27-30; Exhibit 1) Plaintiff was hospitalized at the Payson 
Hospital on that night and the fracture was treated by insertion 
of a traction pin and the institution of traction. This resulted 
in a staphylococcal infection necessitating Buck's traction 
instead of skeletal traction and the administration of substantial 
drug therapy to eliminate the infection which still obtained at 
discharge. (Exhibit 1, Discharge Summary, dated February 22, 1978) 
Plaintiff was not actually discharged from the hospital until 
March 27, 1978. (T. 5, Ln. 16, 17) 
On February 23, 1978, Millie Colby, one of plaintiff's 
children, had plaintiff execute a power of attorney nominating 
Millie as attorney-in-fact for plaintiff to act in her behalf 
(Exhibit 9) directing that "my belongings and any monies derived 
therefrom" be used to pay her just debts and the remainder should 
be paid to her six children and that a proper will should be made 
encompassing these desires. 
-3-
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On March 3, 1978, plaintiff's condition in Payson Hospital 
was as follows: she was 73 years of age and in pain, confused and 
disoriented as to time and place; was under heavy medication for 
pain; suffered from bedsores and constipation; had a staph infec-
tion caused by the traction pin; was under heavy medication to 
eliminate the infection; was catheterized and had ·infection caused 
thereby and was in isolation due to the staph infection. (Exhibit 
1) 
On March 3, 1978, Millie Colby had plaintiff execute a 
warranty deed transfering her fee simple interest in to her home 
tn Nephi to Millie. {Exhibit ·3; T. 15,, Lri. 15-30; 16, Ln. 1-8; 75, 
Ln. 1-8) Millie Colby also had a codicil to plaintiff's will, 
Exhibit 7, drawn up and executed by plaintiff at or about this 
time. (T. 46, Ln. 3-~) On March 17, 1978, Millie Colby had an 
affidavit prepared and executed by plaintiff. (Exhibit 10; T. 81, 
Ln. 19-22) 
While plaintiff was in .the .. hospital Millie Colby closed 
the checking and savings accounts in the names of plaintiff and 
Bonnie and set up the checking account in plaintiff's name only 
and the savings account in plaintiff's ·and Millie's name jointly. 
(T. 45, Ln. 23-30; 57, Ln. 1-30; 58, Ln. 1-30) 
Plaintiff was discharged from the Payson Hospital on 
March 27, 1978, and moved back into her home in Nephi. (T. 53, 
Ln. 19-21) When plaintiff discovered that Millie had had the 
bank accounts changed, she had the accounts changed back into 
her name and Bonnie's name jointly. (T. 46, Ln. 30; 47, Ln. 1-6; 
57, Ln. 1-30; 5-8, Ln. 1-30) Plaintiff paid the 1978 real estate 
-4-
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taxes on her home. (Exhibit 5) 
Plaintiff continued to live in her home in Nephi until 
August of 1979 (T. 53, Ln. 19-21) when her health would no 
longer permit her to live alone. (T. 22, Ln. 25-30; 23, Ln. 1-6) 
On September 1, 1979 she moved into the Golden Living Center in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. (T. 23, Ln. 20, 21) 
In the latter part of September, 1979, Bonnie was going 
to list plaintiff's house for sale when it was discovered for 
the first time that the house was in Millie's name. (T. 18, Ln. 
18-25; 16, Ln. 14-19) Plaintiff originally commenced legal 
action against Millie Colby on October 2, 1979 but the .matter 
was never brought on for trial. (Exhibit 2, Page 61) 
An action was brought in Salt Lake County to establish a 
Conservator.ship for plaintiff with Bonnie as Conservator; and 
then First Security Bank was substituted as Conservator; and 
finally everyone, Bonnie, Millie, Derrall, Mignon, Millie's 
attorney, agreed to Walker Bank as the Conservator. (T. 51, Ln. 
8-15; 52, Ln. 15-21) There was never any dispute as to the neces-
sity for the Conservatorship for plaintiff and Walker Bank refused 
to take the Conservatorship because there was not enough money 
involved. (T. 72, Ln. 29,30) 
Millie Colby died April 6, 1981 and it was shortly after 
this that plaintiff discovered the subject home in Nephi had 
been transferred to defendant, who is the daughter of Millie Colby 
and the granddaughter of plaintiff, by warranty deed. (T. 71, Ln. 
14; 66, Ln. 10-16; Exhibit 2, Page 64) Plaintiff then commenced 
this action against defendant Sharon Colby Kiefer. (R. 1) 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT SETTING ASIDE THE DEEDS FROM 
PLAINTIFF TO MILLIE AND FROM MILLIE TO DEFENDANT IS SUPPORTED 
BY THE REQUISITE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED EY THIS COURT. 
An action to set aside deeds is in equity and " ... this 
Court has the prerogative of reviewing the facts as well as the 
law. However, we must take into account the advantaged position 
of the trial judge and will only reverse where the evidence 
clearly preponderated against his decision." Peterson v. Carter, 
Utah,579 P. 2d 329 (1978) 
A. Burden of Proof 
The case of Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 
122 Utah 268, 248 P. 2d 692 (195~) held that a presumption of 
genuineness, due execution and delivery of a deed arises from 
acknowledgement and recordation of a deed and should be given 
great weight and it should not be overthrown by a mere prepon-
derance of the evidence: but, this rebuttable presumption may be 
overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 
The Court below was aware of this burden and made a spe-
cific finding that all of the allegations of plaintiff's com-
plaint had been proved by clear and convincing evidence. (R. 21) 
It is undisputed that undue influence, duress, fraud and 
the like must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, John-
son v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P. 2d 420 (1959); but it is 
submitted that a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to 
establish the incompetency or lack of mental capacity of a granter. 
-6-
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There is a split of authority on t~e quantum of proof necessary. 
CJS, Deeds, §208(b) ., p 99 states the following: 
Ordinarily, the incapacity of the granter at the 
time of execution of a deed must be proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence, or, as is held in 
some jurisdictions, clear, satisfactory, and con-
vincing evidence, .... 
The:case of Peterson v. Carter, Utah, 579 P. 2d 329 (1978) 
held as follows in regard to the quantum of proof necessary for 
showing incompetency as compared to undue influence at 579 P. 2d 
331: 
... the burden of showing undue influence in the 
execution of the deed is even greater than that of 
showing incompetence. It must be established by 
clear and'convincing evidence that the grantee 
exercised a dominating influence over the granter. 
In the case of Blankenship v. Christensen, Utah, 622 P. 2d 
806 (1981) this Court also appears to have adopted the prepon-
derance of evidence standard to establish the incompetency of a 
granter. This Court held at 622 p; 2d 808: 
Even though it may plausibly be contended that the 
evidence would support a contrary finding, we are 
not persuaded that there is no reasonable basis in 
the evidence to support the trial court's finding 
that at the time he made the assignment to his wife, 
Dee E. Christensen lacked mental capacity and that 
the assignment was thus invalid and passed no inter-
est in the property to her. 
This could not be by clear and convincing evidence as this stan-
dard requires the evide.nce to be such that there is no serious 
or substantial doubt as to the conclusion. Northcrest, Inc. v. 
Walker Bank & Trust Co., supra. 
It is submitted that plaintiff has proved her case by 
clear and convincing evidence wherever necessary and at.the 
very least has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence 
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her lack of capacity to make the deed, (Exhibit 3), on March 3, 
1978. 
B. The Mental Capacity of plaintiff on March 3, 1978. 
This Court has announced the following test in determin-
ing the mental capacity or competency of a granter in making a 
deed, In the case of Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 
2d 142 (1945): 
Were mental facuities so deficient or impaired 
that there was not sufficient power to compre-
hend the subject of the deed, its nature and 
its probable consequences, and to act with dis-
cretion in relation thereto, or with relation 
to ordinary affairs of life? 
The Court below answered the foregoing inquiry in the 
affirnative and made the following findings of fact with reference 
to plaintiff's mental capacity on March 3, 1978: 
3. On January 30, 1978 the Incompetent, age 73, 
broke her right femur and was confined as a bed 
patient in the Payson Hospital, Payson, Utah from 
that date until March 27, 1978. For a substantial 
part of this time, the Incompetent was in pain, 
confused and disoriented as to time and place: was 
under heavy medication for pain: suffered from bed 
sores, constipation, staph infection of the right 
leg, catheterization and infection caused thereby 
and was k~pt~in isolation because of the infection. 
(R. 19, 20) 
This finding is supported by the testimony of Bonnie Shiner 
as follows: 
Q And when you were going in, you had made the 
statement previously that in your conversation with 
Millie that you didn't think that her mental condi-
tion was "too good:" now what, who made that state-
ment, or did you? 
A We both agreed to that. We both talked about it. 
Q Then what was the basis, on what did you base 
that statement? 
A The way she talked. She talked out of her head 
every time that I visited her. 
-8-
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Q Now wait, what's talking "out of her head"? 
A Sometimes she didn't know where she was. She 
talked about her husband, who was no longer living, 
kept crying for him. She didn't know why she was 
in the hospital or what hospital. 
(T. 44, Ln. 16-29) 
The nurse's notes in Exhibit 1 state as follows: 
2-6-78, 1100, patient seems disoriented, pain in 
left leg; 2-b-78, 1300, patient is still disorien-
ted and confused; 2-6-78, 2200, patient confused; 
2-"f-78, 0400, patient disoriented, she states she 
doesn't know where she is; 2-9-78, 1610, patient 
confused at present time, family at bedside; 2-9-78, 
1750, patient confused, looks very tired at present; 
2-9-78, 2000, patient very disoriented and confused; 
2-10-·18, 2400, talking to people who aren't here, 
and as if she was home, keeps trying to get out of 
bed, put restraints on; 2-11-78; 1630, patient in 
pain, a little disoriented; 2-12-78, 2140, gave 
patient medication for sleep - disoriented; 2-14-78, 
U230, awake, appears confused; 2-14-78, 2400, momen-
tarily confused ; 2-15-78, 1200, confused about 
time and date; 2-16-78, 2045, patient crying, stated 
husband passed away year ago; 2-19-78, patient moved 
to isolation; 2-20-78, 1110, crying, asking for 
elders; 2-21-78, 0630, patient appears to be dis-
oriented this a.m.; 2-21-78, 0815, crying and pain 
in leg; 2-21-78, 1000, appears confused, crying and 
asking for deceased husband; 2-21-78, 2140, patient 
was crying, appears confused and calling out for 
Grant; 2-23-78, 0400, awake, seems confused; 2-25-78, 
0700, patient seems confused and disoriented; 2-25-78, 
1330, appears to be confused still; 2-26-78, 0550, 
crying and pain in right leg; 2-27-78, 1230, patient 
depressed; 2-28-78, 1019, patient confused, calls 
for Milly (sic); 3-1-78, 0800, patient awake, con-
fused; J-1-78, 2400, patient awake and very disorien-
ted; 3-2-78, 1335, pain in right leg; 3-3-78, 0540, 
patient awake and crying. R.N. gave medication for 
pain; 3-3-78, 1400, visiting with family; 3-3-78, 
1930, complaints of being depressed, crying at pre-
sent, reported to R.N.; 3-7-78, 2000, patient, just 
nervous; 3-8-78, 0800, patient confused as to place; 
3-9-78, 1015, patient has very negative attitude, 
seems depressed; 3-12-78, 0400, appears confused at 
times; 3-17-78, 2130, patient a little dispondent 0 at 
present; 3-18-78, 0400, patient seems a bit disorien-
ted; 3-18-78, 0600, patient is a bit disoriented, 
thinks she is home; 3-21-78, 0715, on telephone, 
appears to be a little confused; 3-22-78, 0200, 
confused and disoriented; 3-22-78, 2105, patient 
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appears to be confused; 3-23-78, 0800, patient 
asks, "Why am I in the hospital." seems a little 
confused; 3-23-78, 1845, appears disoriented, 
3-24-78, 0245, patient is confused; 3-24-78, 
0310, patient gets upset and confused; 3-25-78, 
2100, seems somewhat confused; 3-26-78, 1845, 
patient seems to have a very negative attitude 
and seems depressed; 3-27-78, 0950, discharged 
to home ... fairly cheerful but somewhat con-
fused. (Exhibit 1) 
Plaintiff's orientation in the hospital can be seen from 
the following: 
Q Do you remember, do you know how long you 
were in the hospital? 
A It seemed like about two or three weeks. 
Q Two or three weeks? 
A Yes. 
* * * 
Q Would you think it might be closer to two 
months? 
A Oh, no, I wasn't there that long. 
Q Okay. 
(T. 13, Ln. lU-14; Ln. 17-19) 
Concerning the execution of the deed: 
A Millie says, "Momma, sign this paper," And I 
said, "What is it?" She said, "It's just a paper." 
Well, how'd I know what I was signing. 
Q Well, did you just go ahead and sign it based 
on that information? 
A I signed it, yes. 
Q You didn't know this was a deed to your house? 
A No, I didn't know nothing. 
Q Did you ever -- well, when did you first find 
out about this deed that you had signed? 
A I don't know. Somebody brought it to me after-
wards. I didn't no more know what I was doing than 
nothing. 
(T. 16, Ln. 1-12) 
-10-
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Q (By Mr. Anderson) Do you remember at the time 
that Millie, that you signed the deed, do you remem-
ber signing the deed? 
A She told me it was just a paper. 
(T. 27, Ln. 28-30; 28, Ln. 1) 
Discovering that she no longer owned the property: 
Q Well, after you got out of the hospital, how 
long was it until you discovered that you didn't 
own your house any longer? 
A Well, I was going to sell it, and I decided 
that it wasn't, I couldn't sell it. They told me 
I couldn't sell it, it wasn't mine. And that is 
unbelievable. You know better than that, Wendell. 
(T. 16, Ln. 13-19) 
Her primary treating physician: 
Q And your doctor's name was Dr. Mendenhall? 
A Dr. McDonald. 
* * * 
Q Do you remember seeing Dr. Mendenhall for your 
leg or anything? 
A I don't know. 
(T. 19, Ln. 3-4; Ln. 7-9) 
About the notary public: 
Q Okay. You don't remember Mr. Harmer notarizing 
your signature, in other words, saying yes? You 
don't remember him talking to you and saying, Millie, 
do you know what this is -- I mean, "Trilba, do you 
know what this is?" 
A No. 
Q You don't recall that? 
A She just had come over and asked me if I'd sign 
the paper, and so I did. 
(T. 28, Ln. 4-11) 
Instructions to Millie: 
Q Did you go ahead and tell her to have a deed 
prepared so you could give her your house? 
A No, 
- -- - _,_ - --
I don't remember nothing like that. I don't 
----~~= ~r doing that at all. 
-----~~--'?"""""''" :: 3 , L n • 1-3) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitizatio  provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant contends that plaintiff's execution of Exhibit 3 
represented a gift of plaintiff's home in Nephi to Mi_llie.-- (T. 91, 
Ln. 6-23). Defendant further testified that Millie told her about 
the gift at the time of the hospitalization, at the time the deed 
was signed in 1~78. (T. 93, Ln. 15-26) 
The Court below further found: 
The Court finds that on March 3, 1978 the Incompetent 
did not have the requisite mental capacity to make a 
valid gift of her home and real property and even if 
she did have the mental capacity to execute the deed 
she did not ~now she was making a gift. The Incompe-
tent did not have the intent to convey the property 
to Millie Colby as her sole and separate property nor 
did she intend to make a gift of the property to Millie 
Colby to the exclusion of her rights and the rights of 
the other heirs. 
(R. 20) 
At the time of the alleged gift to Millie, plaintiff was a 
widow, 73 years of age, with no employment and whose assets con-
sisted of her home in Nephi; $10,000 in savings; a car and miscel-
laneous furniture; a social security check monthly in the sum of 
$478.00; and a monthly VA check in the sum of $75.00. (T. 23, Ln. 
29; 64, Ln. 13; 55, Ln. 14-30; 56, Ln. 1-6) Bonnie Shiner testi-
fied at the time of the trial that there was only $7,900.00 left 
out of the savings. (T. 60, Ln. 5) Plaintiff had been residing at 
the Golden Living Center in Salt Lake City, Utah, since September 
1, 1979, at a basic cost of $650.00 per month. (T. 25, Ln. 9) 
Also, at the time of the alleged gift, plaintiff had five 
other children who she had remembered in her will, E~hibit 7, and 
in the Fower of Attorney, Exhibit 9, executed just eight days prior 
to the execution of Exhibit 3. 
The evidence in support of the above findings of fact is 
overwhelming. 
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C. Duress and Undue Influence. 
The Court below made a finding of fact as follows: 
The Court further finds that Millie Colby exer-
cised duress on the Incompetent in procuring the 
deed from the Incompetent to herself dated and 
recorded March 3, 1981 involving the home and 
real property hereinabove referred to. (R. 20) 
Duress is defined as follows in·CJS, Deeds, §61, p. 727: 
Duress invalidating a deed may be defined as a 
condition of mind produced by improper external 
pressure destroying the free agency of the gran-
ter and inducing him to execute a conveyance not 
of his own volition. 
CJS, Deeds, §61, ·further explains the sufficiency of conduct 
necessary to produce duress at p. 757 as follows: 
Under the modern doctrine there is no exact legal 
standard with respect to the sufficiency of facts 
to produce duress. Accordingly, whether or not a 
deed will be set aside on the ground that it was 
procured through duress depends on the circumstan-
ces of the particular case, such as age, mental 
capacity, and relation of the parties, and pecuniary 
necessity and distress. 
All of the argument with reference to plaintiff's mental 
capacity in the preceding argument is incorporated herein by 
reference. Plaintiff was of limited financial resources and 
testified as follows: 
Q Do you remember Millie coming in and then 
she was saying that Bonnie was going to steal 
all of your money? 
A Yes. 
Q And that Bonnie was going to steal your house, 
too? 
A Yes. Yes. 
Q And that was about the First of March, and 
Bonnie was going to steal everything you had? 
A That's right. 
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Q That's right, you remember that. And then 
Bonnie told you -- or Millie told you that you'd 
better change the bank accounts into her name, 
isn't that right? 
A Right, that's what Millie says. 
(T. 30, Ln. 4-16) 
This testimony is corroborated by defendant's own testi-
mony given to discredit Bonnie Shiner: 
A My grandmother is scared of Bonnie Shiner. 
Q Do you know why? 
A She talks her into doing anything that she 
wants her to do. 
* * * 
A Yes, while my mother, well, my grandmother, 
Trilba, was staying in Payson Hospital, she had 
my mother take her purse home over to her house 
in Spanish Fork· and keep it because she knew that 
Bonnie was coming down that weekend to the hospital 
to see her and she didn't want to have anything 
stolen out of it. 
* * * 
Q Was there anyone in particular she was afraid 
of that would have access to her checking account? 
A Bonnie. 
(T. 90, Ln. 1-4; Ln. 7-12; Ln. 23-25) 
And further by the testimony of Bonnie Shiner: 
A .And my sister asked me what I had done 
with her money. 
Q What was your response? 
A I told her I moved it to Salt Lake City. 
Q And what did she say then? 
A Well, she said I stole it, I never should have 
done that, and I stole her money, I stole everything 
she had. 
(T. 43, Ln. 21-27) 
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As noted in the definition of duress, supra, it is not 
necessary to have the "bare knuckled" variety; it is sufficient 
if "improper external pre~sure" destroys the free will of the 
granter. It is submitted that the threats of what Bonnie was 
going to do with her "belongings" was sufficient pressure on 
plaintiff in her physical and mental condition as to overcome 
her free will; and particularly. if she felt that Millie was 
going to hold the property for her. 
Defendant's attorney's cross-examination of Bonnie attemp-
ted to discredit her to no avail and plaintff 's own evaluation of 
Bonnie is as follows: 
Q Does Bonnie ever steal anything from you? 
A No. She's the one that pays my bills. Never 
in her life. 
_ .... 
* * * 
Q Did you ever have any arrangement with 
reference to your bank accounts with Bonnie? 
A Well, Bonnie paid my bills, and she sees 
that I have enough money to get, to pay my rent 
and get along on. 
* * * 
Q In fact you counted on Millie on a lot of 
things? 
A You bet I did. 
Q Okay. So she helped you out a lot?. 
A You are not kidding. So's Bonnie. 
Q They are good daughters, aren't they? 
A Both of them. I don't know what I'd have 
done without either one of them. 
Q Did you ever give Millie your purse and 
say, "Please take it home so someone won't get 
into it"? 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A No, I don't. 
(T. 30, Ln. 28-30; 11, Ln. 26-29; 28, Ln. 19-28) 
Millie's threats to plaintiff concerning Bonnie were not 
made in the presence of Mr. Harmer or Mrs. Luke. Neither ot 
these parties, based on education and experience, and based on 
a specific interrogation of plaintiff regarding probable conse-
quences of the deed, could render opinions bearing overwhelming 
probative value and the Court below appropriately disregarded 
these opinions or gave them little, if any, weight in making 
its decision. 
Immediately following the above quoted finding of fact, 
the following additional finding of fact appears: 
Persons w~o stood in a fiduciary capacity to 
the Incompetent and who had a duty to tell her 
of the deed failed to do so. 
Plaintiff agrees with the statement appearing in appellant's 
brief at page 16, "The only 'person' to whom the finding could 
refer is Millie Colby." 
The case of Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 
420 (1959) refers to and treats duress and undue influence as 
one and the same where a confidential relationship exists. The 
Johnson case, supra, was urged on the Court below as the law of 
the case and the result reached by the said Court is consistent 
with the Johnson case on facts that are strikingiy similar. 
The finding with reference to the fiduciary duty of Millie 
Colby is tantamount to a finding that a confidential relationship 
existed and there is ample evidence in support of the same in 
addition to the mother-daughter relationship: Millie had plaintiff 
give her a power of attorney on February 23, 1978; had all of 
the bank accounts changed by deleting Bonnie as a co-tenant on 
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or about March 1, 1978; took the warranty deed in question to 
plaintiff's home on March 3, 1978; took an affidavit from plain-
tiff on March 17, 1978; and had a will or codicil prepared and 
executed by plaintiff du~ing plaintiff's hospitalization. 
Once again, the testimony of plaintiff is helpful on the 
issue of the confidential relationship: 
Q In fact you counted on Millie on a lot of 
things? 
A You bet I did. 
Q Okay. So she helped you out a lot? 
A You are not kidding. So's Bonnie. 
Q They are good daughters, aren't they? 
A Both of them. I don't know what I~d have 
done without either of them. 
(T. 28, Ln. 19-25) 
Defendant also knew the relationship between her mother 
Millie and plaintiff: 
Q Okay. To your own knowledge, what was the 
relationship between your mother and your grand-
mother, Trilba? 
A They had a very good mother-daughter rela-
tionship. 
Q Okay. 
A My mother did a lot of things for my grand-
mother. She always thought a lot of her. 
Q Okay. And in fact do you have personal 
knowledge that while your mother was in the hospi-
tal and prior to that time that -- or, excuse me, 
-- your grandmother was in the hospital that your 
mother actually handled some financial affairs for 
your grandmother? 
A Yes, I.do. 
Q Do you have personal knowledge as to whether 
or not your mother's name was on some of your grand-
mother's accounts? 
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A Yes, I do. 
(T. 88, Ln. 22-30; 89, Ln. 1-8) 
The test of the existence of a confidential relationship 
sufficient to raise a presumption of unfairness as to a convey-
ance is set forth in the case of Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 
2d 378, 410 P. 2d 17 (1965). The evidence is abundant to show 
that plaintiff reposed great confidence in Millie.on March 3, 
1978, and was in a position of inequality due to the mental and 
physical factors at that time;· and that on the aforementioned 
date, Millie was clearly in a position of superiority. Also, 
the confidence reposed in Millie carried with it an express 
legal duty and an abiding moral duty in general and specifically 
with respect to plaintiff's.home. 
Defendant claims that the deed represents a gift by plain-
tiff of the home in Nephi to Millie ana the deed from Millie to her 
is also a gift. Applying the law of Johnson v. Johnson, supra, 
to the case at bar, a presumption of the unfairness of the said 
gift arises which in and of itself will support a finding of duress 
and/or undue influence unless the presumption is overcome by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the transaction was fair. 
At the time of making the alleged gift on March 3, 1978, it 
represented her greatest asset and the place to which she was going 
to return when and if she was discharged from the hospital; if she 
lived in. the home she would have adequate funds, social security 
and veterans administration, with which to maintain herself; she 
had six children and had expressed the desire to leave her "belon-
gings" to these children in the 1965 will and the February 23, 1978 
Power of Attorney; there was nothing in the records to impell 
plaintiff to make a gift to Millie to the exclusion of the other 
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children and indeed to the exclusion of herself as duly noted 
by the Court in a previous finding of fact. 
Thus, the Court's findings with reference to duress and/or 
undue influence and the fiduciary relationship of Millie to plain-
tiff and in fact to the other heirs are supported by clear and 
convincing evidence or the unrebutted presumption of unfairness. 
D. Gift or Trust 
Defendant's testimony as to the gift made by plaintiff to 
Millie and then from Millie to defendant was clear and unequivo-
cal. 
Q Now, was this, the signing of the deed by 
your mother to you, was there any consideration 
for that? By that I mean, was it a gift or was 
it some type of bargain that you had struck 
between you? 
A My mother wanted me to have the house. 
Q Now, to your knowledge is that the same 
reason that Trilba gave the house to Millie? 
A Yes. 
* * * 
Q In other words, that deed from Trilba to 
your mother, that was a gift? 
A Yes. 
Q That was a gift. This Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 
is a gift? 
A Yes. 
* * * 
Q Well when when was that that she told you 
that ~he had re~eived it from? When did you first 
hear that, that she had received this house from 
Trilba as a gift? 
A Shortly after the deed was signed from Trilba 
to my mother. 
Q In other words, back in 1978, back in right 
- -~ ~L- ~~-- -~ that hospitalization, at the 
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time that it was signed, that's when you were 
told that it was a gift from Trilbe (sic) to 
Millie? 
A Yes. 
* * * 
Q In other words, a week after June 30th of 
1980, your mother Millie called you in Denver 
and said, "You have a house," that she had exe-
cuted a deed and recorded it, is that correct? 
a No. She called me after the 10th of July. 
The deed was not recorded until the 10th of July. 
Q Oh, it was dated then - -
A It was dated June 30th, but it was not 
recorded down here. in the courthouse until the 
10th of July. She called me approximately about 
a week after that and told me that. 
Q And that this was your house? 
A Yes. 
(T. 91, Ln. 6-13; 91, Ln. 18-23; 93, Ln. '17-26; 
92, Ln. 30; 93, Ln. 1-12) 
The Court below made short work of this claim by defendant 
and found that plaintiff did not" ... intend to make a gift of 
the property to Millie Colby ... " In making this ruling, the 
Court relied heavily on the testimony of Miriam Winn, a daughter 
of Millie Colby and a half-sister to defendant, concerning the 
intent of plaintiff in making the warranty deed, Exhibit 3. Mrs. 
Winn testified as follows: 
A She -- I knew that it had been turned over, 
that it had been turned over to Momma while Grandma 
was still in the hospital. By phone. I don't 
remember whether I called Momma or she called me. 
But a number of times we talked about it. The idea 
behind the whole thing that Momma could see was that 
Grandma kept telling her Bonnie had stolen her money, 
she wouldn't have a home to live in, and she wanted 
Momma to put it in her name, that she was afraid that 
she wouldn't have it when she was ready for it. So 
Momma done this. At that time they tried to straigh-
ten it out between the two of them, and cesulted in 
a lot of argument. 
* * * 
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Q Did you ever have any conversations with 
Bonnie concerning this house? 
A Yes, uh-huh. 
Q When did they take place? 
A Well, with Grandma, and we had talked about 
what we were going to do. The house originally 
was put in Mamma's name to be held for Grandma. 
(T. 68, Ln. 20-30; 71, Ln. 19-25) 
On November 1, 1979, a hearing was held in Third District 
Court wherein Walker Bank & Trust Company, by stipulation between 
all of the parties involved, was appointed Conservator of plain-
tiff's estate. A conversation took place between Millie and Mrs. 
Winn in the hallway before the hearing concerning plaintiff's 
Exhibit 8, a quit-claim deed from Millie to First Security Bank 
on plaintiff's home: 
A We talked outside before we were waiting 
for the-other hearing to be over. And at that 
time I said to my mother, "What are we going to 
do about the house? What do you want to do about 
it?" And Momma said, "As soon as the bank has 
this in hand, I will sign it back." 
* * * 
A Like I tell you, she was very ill. She was 
concerned she wouldn't be able to do anything 
with the house and that it would be turned over 
to Bonnie without it being turned to Grandma. So 
a couple of times she tried to get me to go to 
the courthouse with her and have it put in my name. 
* * * 
A Yes. I told her I'd rather not get involved 
in it. I thought it was between her, her brothers 
and sisters, and Grandma. And so then I wouldn't 
go and have it put in my name. 
(T. 67, Ln. 29, 30; 68, Ln. 1-3; 69, Ln. 23-29; 
70, Ln. 13-16) 
After Millie's death, Mrs. Winn had a conversation with 
defendant concerning plaintiff's home: 
A on the phone. I called Sharon to tell her that 
rs were coming down and they need-
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ed the papers from the bedroom, where they were, 
and that they would need them to get the house 
straightened around for Grandma. And she said, 
"Okay." About twenty minutes later she called 
me back and said she thought she should be the 
one to tell me that Momma had turned the house 
over to her, and what should she do. I said, 
"Sharon, you should .turn the house back to 
Grandma." She said, "No, the house was signed 
over to me and I'm keeping it." 
(T. 70, Ln. 30; 71, Ln. 1-9) 
This conversation was corroborated by defendant: 
A And so I called Mairiam (sic) back and told 
her that I wanted to be the one to tell her that 
mother had given me the house. 
Q Okay. 
A She told me that she didn't feel like the 
house was mother's to be giving away. 
(T. 87, Ln. 23-28) 
This testimony, taken with all of the other evidence con-
cerning the transfer from plaintiff to Millie, would justify a 
finding of an express or implied trust, or at the very least, a· 
constructive trust. Hawkins ·v. Perry, Utah I 25 3 P • 2d 
372 (1935). 
The testimony of plaintiff on recross-examination, relied 
upon heavily by defendant throughout her brief: 
Q That's right. And isn't it true that you gave 
her the house and that you wanted her to have the 
house, but now that she's dead you want it back; is 
that right? 
A That's correct; 
(T. 33, Ln. 13-16) 
is consistent with the idea that Millie held the property for 
plaintiff to be returned at some future time. 
If the deed from plaintiff to Millie fails for any reason, 
the deed from Millie to defendant also fails as there is nothing 
to convey. Blankenship v. Christensen, supra. 
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E. Consideration. 
Defendant testified as follows concerning the deeds to 
plaintiff's home: 
Q Now, it was a gift, as far as you were 
concerned, you didn't pay any money for this 
house? 
A No, I did not. 
Q What about your morn, Millie, did she pay 
any money? Did she ever tell you anything about 
that? 
A No, I never heard her mention anything 
about it. 
(T. 95, Ln. 1-6) 
Defendant claimed at the pre-trial hearing that the con-
sideration for both deeds was as·follows: 
Mr. Anderson: Yes, there was consideration. We 
allege that there was consideration on the part 
of Mrs. Colby to Mrs. Jones, and then on the part 
of Mrs. Kiefer to Mrs. Colby. 
* * * 
Mr. Anderson: She was her daughter, and she was 
taking care of her. It was much the same as the 
original consideration. They were taking care of 
their mothers, and in consideration of that. 
(Pretrial T. 10, Ln. 25-28; 11, Ln. 3-6) 
The case of Jordan v. Jordan, Utah, 445 P. 2d 765 (1968) 
relied on by defendant, refers to love, affection and ensuing 
actions as consideration for the deed in that case. However, 
the grantee in that case had promised to care for the granter 
during his declining years which was the actual consideration 
rather than love and affection. 
There was no evidence adduced at the trial to show any 
intent on Millie's part to care for plaintiff in consideration 
for the deed. In fact, at the time of the transfer, Millie was 
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residing in a rented apartment in Spanish Fork and did not 
after the conveyance ever live in plaintiff's home in Nephi. 
Love and affection and caring for plaintiff was not even 
mentioned in defendant's closing argument. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant's Motion for a new trial is based on Rule 59(a) (3) 
of the URCP relating to accident and surprise. (R. 27) Defendant's 
claim in.her brief is that the" .establishment of a trust or 
other fiduciary relationship . " was not established as an 
issue at the pre-trial conference. During the pre-trial hearing, 
the following occurred: 
The Court: Al right, what are they? 
Mr. Ables: The next one is undue influence. Fourth 
one is no consideration. And fifthly, that convey-
ance was made to Millie Colby for her to hold until 
eitherTrilba Jones got well; or if she was deceased, 
she was supposed to administer it under the will. 
Mr. Anderson: I don't think that was pled. That's 
a new one on me. 
The Court: Don't you have some problems with the 
parol evidence rule on that? 
Mr. Ables: Well, of course we have, Mrs. Jones 
could go ahead and testify as to that. 
The Court: All right, we'll leave it as an issue. 
(Pretrial T. 8, Ln. 26-30; 9, 1-9) 
Then, from this erroneous premise, defendant argues that 
because Miriam Winn was not mentioned at the pre-trial as a poten-
tial witness and she testified that Millie was holding plaintiff's 
home in order to protect it from Bonnie, that this constitutes 
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II 
.surprise in the raising of a new issue." 
The objection raised by defendant on T. 69, 70 that 
No 
objection was made to Mrs. Winn as a witness on the basis of 
accident or surprise or on any other basis. 
The case of Jensen v. Thomas, Utah, 570 P. 2d 695 (1977) 
is in point and holds that even assuming accident or surprise, 
it must be such that " ... ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against." 
Defendant claims that Clint Colby could have rebutted 
Mrs. Winn's testimony. It is atonishing that Clint Colby, Millie's 
husband, defendant's father and Mrs. Winn's step-father, who was 
present at the time Exhibit 3 was executed was not called by 
defendant as a witness in the f~rst place. Not only did Mr. Colby 
not testify, he was not even in Court at the time of the trial. 
Defendant testified as to the conversation she had with 
Mrs. Winn concerning the purpose of the deed and it could not have 
been a surprise to defendant when Mrs. Winn appeared in Court. 
Ordinary prudence suggests having Mr. Colby available just in case; 
assuming his version of the facts was tbe same as defendant's. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP WAS 
PROPERLY RECEIVED. 
Defendant has complained that before the evidence of a 
fiduciary relationship could be received, it should have been 
specifically pleaded in plaintiff's complaint. The issue was 
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raised at the pre-trial hearing and that is tantamount to an 
amendment of plaintiff's complaint. The purpose of the plead-
ings is to give notice to the opposing party and the notice 
was given at the time of the pre-trial hearing. Plaintiff's 
complaint could have been amended at the pre-trial hearing and 
could have been amended after the trial to conform to the evi-
dence. Rule 15,. URCP. 
Also, the finding could have been based on the Power of 
Attorney, Exhibit 9, which was introduced into evidence by 
defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence supports the findings of the Court below 
in whatever quantum necessary and the judgment of the Court setting 
aside the deeds from plaintiff to Millie and from Millie to 
defendant should be affirmed; and if necessary, new findings and 
conclusions should be made by this Court affirming the result 
reached by the Court below. To reverse the judgment for plaintiff 
and enter one in favor of the defendant would be to sustain the 
deed from plaintiff to Millie as a gift which, based on this 
record and the realities and verities of life, would be incredible 
and work a manifest injustice on plaintiff. 
DATED this day of September, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wendell P. Ables 
Suite 14, Intrade Building 
1399 South Seventh East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed 
two true and correct copies of the for~going, postage pre-
paid, on the day of September, 1982, and further 
certify that on the day of September, 1982, I hand 
delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing to 
the following: 
Robert J. Schumacher 
81 East Center Street 
P~ 0. Box 1667 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(Hand delivery to the Court hearing on 
the above matter) 
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